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The Case for Candor 
APPLICATION OF THE SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
PRIVILEGE TO CORPORATE DIVERSITY INITIATIVES 
Pam Jenoff† 
INTRODUCTION 
In July 2009, newspaper headlines across the country 
detailed a high-profile incident in which a white state trooper 
in Cambridge, Massachusetts had responded to a report of a 
possible midday break-in at a Harvard Square residence by 
“two males, unknown race.”1 As the trooper, Sergeant James 
Crowley, approached the residence, the dispatcher radioed him 
that the two men were black.2 Crowley confronted the men, one 
of whom turned out to be Henry Gates, a highly respected 
Harvard professor and the owner of the house, in the foyer.3 
When Crowley asked Gates to step onto the porch and produce 
identification, Gates refused.4 The confrontation between the 
men escalated and Gates was arrested, taken from his own 
home in handcuffs, and charged with disorderly conduct.5  
Allegations of racial discrimination followed from local, 
national, and international media. Everyone from the Reverend 
Jesse Jackson to President Barack Obama weighed in, and 
tempers flared. The controversy seemed inevitably destined to 
escalate.6 However, a full-scale crisis was averted when Obama 
invited Gates and Crowley to the White House to discuss the 
  
 † Clinical Assistant Professor, Rutgers University School of Law—Camden. I 
would like to thank Michael Carrier, Arthur Laby, Sarah Ricks, Ruth Anne Robbins, 
and Rick Swedloff for their helpful comments. 
 1 Don Van Natta, Jr. & Abby Goodnough, After Call to Police, 2 Cambridge 
Worlds Collide in an Unlikely Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2009, at A13. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Peter Baker & Helene Cooper, President Tries to Defuse Debate over Gates 
Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2009, at A1. 
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incident over drinks.7 This so-called “Beer Summit” produced 
two positive results. First, Gates and Crowley were able to 
engage in a difficult but candid dialogue, both at the White 
House and on a subsequent occasion in Cambridge, which 
helped them to appreciate how the misunderstanding between 
them had arisen.8 Second, a task force was formed to study 
police-community relations on a broader level, with the goal of 
long-term reform.9 
The situation that transpired in Cambridge is evocative 
of scenarios that play out daily in workplaces across the United 
States. Employees raise allegations of discrimination and/or 
harassment, based on race, gender, age, or other protected 
classifications, as a result of interactions with or treatment by 
supervisors or colleagues. In response, companies investigate 
and attempt to address these individual concerns. They also 
seek to improve diversity and workplace relations at-large 
through various types of initiatives. First, using either internal 
resources or outside consultants, companies undertake 
assessments of their workforce demographics, including 
objective factors such as employee composition, recruitment, 
promotion, compensation, and retention.10 These assessments 
can also evaluate subjective elements such as employee morale, 
perceptions, and concerns, and look at the efficacy of equal 
employment and antidiscrimination policies.11 Armed with the 
results of such audits, companies can provide diversity training 
and organize diversity councils or committees in order to 
improve workplace relations12  
Yet despite the similarities in the tensions and issues 
giving rise to the impetus for dialogue and reform in these two 
scenarios, these workplace diversity initiatives face a 
significant barrier that the Beer Summit did not: corporate 
efforts to assess, discuss, and improve diversity are often met 
with resistance from a company’s legal department. Counsel—
  
 7 Helene Cooper & Abby Goodnough, In a Reunion Over Beers, No Apologies, 
but Cordial Plans to Have Lunch Sometime, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2009, at A10. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Meghan E. Irons, National Panel Picked to Review Gates Arrest; Police 
Procedure Among the Topics, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 11, 2009, at B3; Krissah Thompson, 
Group to Review Henry Gates Incident, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2009, at A4. 
 10 Michael Delikat, The Texaco Case and Lessons to Learn: How Can 
Corporations Manage Diversity Effectively?, in LITIGATING EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION CASES 181, 197 (Practicing Law Inst. 1997). 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
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concerned about the very real possibility that documents and 
conversations regarding diversity shortfalls and corrective 
measures may subsequently be used as evidence by plaintiffs in 
discrimination lawsuits—often discourage, limit, or in some 
cases veto outright the implementation of diversity studies and 
programs.13 Ironically, these objections preclude diversity 
initiatives that might reduce the amount of employment 
litigation faced by a company in the long run. They also result 
in a culture where open dialogue on diversity issues is stymied 
to the detriment of employee relations and morale at-large. 
One possible solution to this problem is the application of 
the self-critical analysis privilege to documents and other 
information regarding corporate diversity initiatives. The self-
critical analysis, also called the self-evaluative privilege, has 
developed through the federal common law for exactly this 
purpose—to permit organizations to engage in candid self-
examination that has institutionally and socially desirable 
benefits.14 It has been recognized by courts in other contexts, 
such as aviation safety reports,15 industrial safety team 
minutes,16 and environmental compliance reports.17 Applying the 
privilege to employment documents such as corporate diversity 
studies would allow companies to undertake rigorous self-
assessment with the goal of improving workforce demographics 
and relations, without the fear of discovery in litigation.  
However, courts have been largely unwilling to 
recognize the self-critical analysis privilege in the employment 
context.18 This has left companies with uncertainty as to 
whether the privilege will apply and a general presumption 
that it will not—a situation that provides virtually no incentive 
to engage in self-examination of workforce issues beyond the 
bare minimum required by law, and to do little other than put 
a best face on the results of any studies undertaken.  
  
 13 Id. at 203; see also Holt v. KMI-Cont’l, Inc., 95 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1996); 
Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Hardy v. New York 
News Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 14  See Johnson v. United Parcel Serv., 206 F.R.D. 686, 688-89 (M.D. Fl. 2002) 
(explaining the self-critical analysis privilege generally).  
 15 Tice v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 270, 273 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
 16 Hickman v. Whirlpool Corp., 186 F.R.D. 362, 363-64 (N.D. Ohio 1999). 
 17 Joiner v. Hercules, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 695, 699 (S.D. Ga. 1996). 
 18 See Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The 
Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. 
REV. 913, 993-96 (1999). 
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Moreover, the fact that diversity documents and other 
information may ultimately wind up in litigation has a chilling 
effect on workplace discourse, as individual employees may be 
reticent to come forward and speak freely for fear of disclosure. 
For example, courts have declined to recognize the application 
of the privilege for documents containing the conclusions of a 
voluntary diversity committee regarding corporate diversity 
efforts19 and also with respect to employee statements 
regarding diversity in employee relations surveys.20 If 
employees are left to fear that their comments made in 
contexts such as these may be subject to scrutiny in litigation, 
they are surely less likely to participate in such initiatives with 
full candor. The net effect is that cultural change is stifled and 
the impetus toward improvement is lost at the expense of 
costly litigation.  
This article argues that courts’ reluctance to recognize 
the privilege can be attributed to three factors. First, courts 
have erroneously relied upon University of Pennsylvania v. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,21 a case in which 
the Supreme Court declined to apply the self-critical analysis 
privilege to peer reviews conducted as part of the faculty 
tenure process, as a signal that the self-critical analysis 
privilege should not be applied generally in the employment 
context. This approach ignores the significant factual 
differences between University of Pennsylvania and other 
employment cases, such as those involving corporate diversity 
documents, as well as the narrow language of the Court’s 
holding construing the issue in this fact-specific context.  
Second, courts have misapplied the criteria that must be 
assessed to determine whether the self-critical analysis 
privilege should apply in employment cases. Specifically, they 
have favored bright-line tests that consider whether the 
documents were created voluntarily or as part of mandatory 
government reporting, and whether the information contained 
in the documents is of objective or subjective nature.22 Reliance 
upon these artificial distinctions at the expense of the more 
nuanced balancing test that is at the heart of the privilege 
  
 19 Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 199 F.R.D. 379, 386 (N.D. Ga. 2001); 
Vanek v. Nutrasweet Co., No. 92 C 0115, 1992 WL 133162, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 1992). 
 20 Davis v. Kraft Foods N. Am., No. 03-6060, 2006 WL 3486461, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 
Dec. 1, 2006); Johnson v. United Parcel Serv., 206 F.R.D. 686, 689-90 (M.D. Fl. 2002). 
 21 493 U.S. 182 (1990). 
 22  See infra Part III.B. 
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analysis unduly excludes documents from protection and is 
inconsistent with the purpose of the privilege itself.  
Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, courts have 
failed to recognize the changing nature of employment law, as 
reflected in more recent Supreme Court cases, which 
emphasizes the primacy of preventative and remedial 
measures by employers in effectuating the purpose of federal 
antidiscrimination laws.23 This framework shift provides a basis 
for recognizing that self-examination, such as diversity studies 
and initiatives, is fundamental to the proactive measures in 
which the Court has mandated that employers engage, and 
that application of the self-critical analysis privilege to such 
endeavors is both necessary and appropriate. 
This article examines the need for the self-critical 
analysis privilege in employment cases to protect documents 
such as diversity studies. Part I begins by defining the critical 
role that diversity plays in corporate culture today and 
explaining the ways companies seek to assess and improve 
diversity. Part II then chronicles the evolution of the self-
critical analysis privilege in the employment context. Part III 
examines the historic reasons for its rejection and presents the 
three factors enumerated above as the reasons underlying 
courts’ reluctance to recognize the privilege. 
Part IV demonstrates that by revisiting outdated and 
flawed assumptions regarding the respective roles of 
prevention and remediation in employment discrimination law 
as articulated in more recent Supreme Court jurisprudence,24 
courts can and should recognize the self-critical analysis 
privilege for employment documents such as workplace 
diversity initiatives. This article concludes by proposing that by 
engaging in a nuanced balancing test that weighs the relative 
benefits and harms that would arise from disclosure of the 
documents in a particular case, courts can create a well-
tailored and clearly defined privilege on which companies can 
rely, thereby encouraging corporate self-examination that will 
improve diversity and employee relations at-large, while still 
ensuring that plaintiffs have access to the information they 
need to pursue their claims. 
  
 23 Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999); Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 
742, 765 (1998). 
 24 See sources cited supra note 23. 
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I. UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE DIVERSITY INITIATIVES 
Diversity has become an increasingly important part of 
American corporate culture in the past several decades.25 
Federal laws, such as Civil Rights Act of 1964 (commonly 
known as “Title VII”),26 the Americans with Disabilities Act,27 
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,28 protect 
employees from discrimination on the basis of such factors as 
race, disability, or age. However, companies have come to 
realize that recruiting and retaining a diverse workforce is 
more than just a legal obligation—it is essential for successful 
business operations.29 As one commentator noted, “Managing 
diversity has been defined as ‘a desire to recognize, respect and 
capitalize on different strands and backgrounds in American 
society, like race, ethnic origin and gender.’”30  
Thus, companies spend a significant amount of time and 
resources developing initiatives designed to assess and improve 
diversity. They regularly retain outside consultants and/or 
create high-level positions, and in some cases entire 
departments, devoted to analyzing and addressing diversity 
issues.31 Corporations tout their diversity programs internally 
as a means of improving workplace morale and promote such 
initiatives outside the company to help recruitment, 
community relations, and reputation among peer entities. 
Moreover, such diversity programs are well received by 
federal and state agencies charged with monitoring and 
enforcing equal employment opportunity and 
nondiscrimination laws, which generally regard such 
initiatives as examples of responsible corporate citizenship.32 
For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) Task Force on Best Practices for Private Sector 
Employers noted in its report:  
[A]s work progressed on the submissions made by various 
companies, it became clear that a number of them had done 
  
 25 Christopher Reynolds & Jane Howard-Martin, Corporate Diversity 
Initiatives and Programs—Between a Rock and a Hard Place, in 33RD ANNUAL 
INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 39, 41 (Practicing Law Inst. 2004). 
 26 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to -17 (2006).  
 27 Id. §§ 12101-12213.  
 28 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).  
 29 Delikat, supra note 10, at 196. 
 30 Id.  
 31 Id. at 197-98. 
 32 Reynolds & Howard-Martin, supra note 25, at 41. 
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outstanding work in formulating comprehensive EEO and diversity 
strategies. Further, these companies impressed the Task Force with 
their ability to integrate workplace EEO and diversity into their 
basic business plans. The latter concept, i.e., that in a diverse nation 
and in a diverse world, having a diverse workforce is, at least, a 
business asset and, more likely, a business necessity, is the primary 
revelation of the work done by the Task Force.33  
Diversity programs generally operate on two levels: first, 
persons charged with diversity matters conduct audits of various 
components of workplace diversity. These may include a 
snapshot of the demographic composition of the workforce 
overall, as well as an examination of protected groups in 
comparison with the larger population with respect to factors 
such as recruitment, promotions, compensation, and retention.34 
They also evaluate the efficacy of relevant company policies and 
procedures and may look at the history of discrimination and 
harassment complaints made both internally and to outside 
agencies.35 Additionally, such studies also assess subjective 
issues, including employee opinions, concerns, and morale, 
through surveys, interviews, and focus groups.36  
Diversity studies may reveal institutional problems 
such as disparities in compensation, trends with respect to 
certain types of discrimination complaints, or endemic 
perception issues. Armed with the results of the audit, 
companies then embark upon the second component of most 
diversity programs: remediation and improvement.37 (Of course, 
companies may also undertake training and other initiatives 
without the benefit of diversity studies; however, the results of 
such self-examination enable an organization to custom tailor a 
diversity program and direct resources to the areas with the 
greatest need.) Initiatives may include reassessment of 
practices and policies, as well as training of supervisors and 
the workforce at-large.38  
In addition, many companies seek to implement a 
diversity committee or council to improve workplace relations.39 
  
 33 EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, BEST PRACTICES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR 
EMPLOYERS (2009), available at http://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_reports/best_practices. 
cfm?renderforprint=1. 
 34 Delikat, supra note 10, at 197-98. 
 35 Id. at 199. 
 36 Id. at 198-99. 
 37 Id. at 200-01. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See id. at 202.  
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Such an entity, generally made up of a wide range of employees 
representing various demographic groups and job levels, may 
engage in numerous activities, from informal discussions of 
prejudices and stereotypes they perceive within the company or 
larger society, to role playing and exercises, and even crafting 
suggestions for corporate reform.40 Indeed, such dialogues may 
also be useful in revealing previously undisclosed biases that 
need to be addressed.41 
Attempts to undertake the aforementioned diversity 
initiatives are greatly limited, however, by concerns over 
potential legal liability. In-house counsel, or in some cases 
outside counsel acting in a policing function, may restrict or 
reject diversity assessments and dialogues out of concern that 
problems revealed in the self-audit or the comments made in 
diversity discussions may be discoverable and used against the 
company as evidence of discrimination or harassment in 
subsequent employment litigation. Where assessments are 
permitted to proceed, the scope and rigor of the analysis, as 
well as the content of the final results, may be severely 
constrained by these liability concerns.42 
II. HISTORY OF THE SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE IN 
THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT 
Evidentiary privileges are, by definition, the narrow 
exceptions to the rule that plaintiffs are entitled to unfettered 
discovery of “every man’s evidence.”43 They reflect societal 
choices that certain relationships (such as those between 
husbands and wives) or activities (such as seeking legal or 
medical advice) should be valued above others.  
The concept of privilege, which dates back to the 
sixteenth-century institution of compulsory appearance at 
court in the English common law system, evolved from two 
  
 40 See id. at 200.  
 41 See Pollard, supra note 18, at 947. 
 42 See Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study 
of the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 191, 271-74 (1989) (noting attorneys’ propensity 
to sanitize advice where privilege is not available). Conversely, this study found that in 
the scenario where a well-established privilege such as the attorney-client privilege could 
be relied upon, two-thirds of attorneys surveyed indicated that they had specifically 
raised the privilege as a means of encouraging candid discourse. Id. at 243. 
 43 United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (3d ed. 1940)); see also John Louis Kellog, What’s Good for 
the Goose…Differential Treatment of the Deliberative Process and Self-Critical Analysis 
Privileges, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 255, 256 (1997).  
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different theoretical schools.44 Early notions of privilege were 
grounded in a humanist rationale, which based the justification 
for withholding certain information from discovery upon 
normative human values such as honor and privacy.45  
However, modern privilege law derives primarily from a 
second, instrumentalist theory, which explains that “the primary 
justification for privileges is that if confidential communications 
or documents are subject to discovery in litigation, this lack of 
complete confidentiality will negatively affect numerous socially-
useful functions and relationships.”46 Thus, under an 
instrumentalist conception, society needs privileges because in 
their absence, individuals will be discouraged from engaging in 
certain socially desirable behavior.47  
The instrumentalist rationale was codified by John 
Henry Wigmore, who, in his treatise on evidence, set forth four 
fundamental criteria necessary for the establishment of a 
privilege:  
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not 
be disclosed. (2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the 
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. (3) 
The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought 
to be sedulously fostered. (4) The injury that would inure to the relation 
by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit 
thereby gained for correct disposal of the litigation.48  
These considerations generally underpin the application of 
modern privilege theory, including that of the self-critical 
analysis privilege. 
A. The Employment Context 
As a preliminary matter, it is significant to note that the 
majority of employment cases are brought pursuant to the 
federal nondiscrimination statutes, such as Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (commonly known as “Title VII”),49 the Americans with 
Disabilities Act,50 and the Age Discrimination in Employment 
  
 44 EDWARD J. IMWINKELREID, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 
98 (Richard D. Friedman ed., 2002). 
 45 Id. at 105. 
 46 Id. at 108-09. 
 47 Id. at 110-12; see also Pollard, supra note 18, at 998. 
 48 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 527 (Little, 
Brown & Co. 1961). 
 49 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to -17 (2006). 
 50 Id. §§ 12101-12213.  
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Act.51 Thus, the battle over the self-critical analysis privilege in 
the employment context has been fought primarily in the 
federal courts.  
It is also important to recognize that the debate over the 
self-critical analysis privilege in the employment context 
initially arose with respect to affirmative action plans, and the 
cases have largely focused on that issue.52 Employers who are 
awarded government contracts are generally required under 
Executive Order 11246 to submit to the Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) annual Equal 
Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action reports. 
These reports detail objective data as to the hiring, 
termination, compensation, and promotions of candidates in 
protected groups in comparison to the workforce at-large, and 
subjective analysis as to how the employer assesses its own 
performance and intends to improve in the coming year.53 
Plaintiffs in employment litigation have sought access not only 
to the empirical data submitted to the government with respect 
to affirmative action, but also to the subjective portions of the 
reports in which employers are required to address deficiencies 
and propose plans to improve same.54  
The discoverability of mandatory affirmative action 
plans prepared for the OFCCP, while informative from a 
historical perspective, is not the focus of this article. First, 
since only companies with government contracts are required 
to submit affirmative action reports, the discussion of that 
issue alone has narrow application. Moreover, the peculiarities 
of OFCCP affirmative action programs, in terms of their 
mandatory nature and specific reporting requirements, render 
them inapposite for the present discussion of diversity 
initiatives, most of which are voluntary. Most fundamentally, 
the continued reliance on these programs as the primary 
vehicle for debate is misplaced. Before the development of the 
present-day diversity management culture, the self-analysis 
  
 51 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).  
 52 See generally Ellen Deason, The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege and 
Discovery of Affirmative Action Plans in Title VII Suits, 83 MICH. L. REV. 405 (1984); 
see also Donald P. Vandegrift, Jr., The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis: A Survey of 
the Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 171, 180 (1996) (“In general, the battleground [for the self-
critical analysis privilege] in equal employment cases is the affirmative action plan.”). 
 53 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.7 (2006).  
 54  See, e.g., Witten v. A.H. Smith & Co., 100 F.R.D. 446 (D. Md. 1984), aff’d, 
785 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1986); Dickerson v. U.S. Steel Corp., 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
(BNA) 1448 (E.D. Pa. 1976). 
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done as part of the OFCCP process was once the predominant 
means by which companies assessed workforce diversity. 
Today, however, it is largely ancillary to the myriad other tools 
of self-assessment and self-improvement that companies seek 
to undertake voluntarily as a business best practice with 
respect to diversity initiatives globally and not just those 
required by government contracts. 
B. Origins of the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege 
For the many employment discrimination lawsuits that 
arise under the numerous federal statutes protecting 
employees from discrimination, federal evidentiary privileges 
will apply. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that:  
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United 
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the 
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a 
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof 
shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may 
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of 
reason and experience.55  
Thus, the Federal Rules of Evidence grant authority to 
federal courts to recognize privileges as they evolve and 
develop in the common law. By enacting Rule 501 rather than 
specific privilege rules, Congress’s purpose was “to provide the 
courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case 
by case basis.”56  
The self-critical analysis privilege is such a privilege, 
created not by the Constitution, Congress, or the Supreme 
Court, but rather through federal jurisprudence of the past 
four decades. The foundation for the privilege was laid by the 
District Court for the District of Columbia in 1970.57 In Bredice 
v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., the court held that the defendant 
hospital’s meeting minutes and reports regarding a patient’s 
death were not subject to discovery in a medical malpractice 
action.58 The court did not specifically mention the self-critical 
analysis privilege, but noted that “[t]here is an overwhelming 
public interest in having those staff meetings held on a 
  
 55 FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 56 120 CONG. REC. 40,891 (1974). 
 57 Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), aff’d, 479 F.2d 
920 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also Vandegrift, supra note 52, at 178. 
 58 Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 251. 
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confidential basis so that the flow of ideas and advice can 
continue unimpeded. . . . These committee meetings, being 
retrospective with the purpose of self improvement, are entitled 
to a qualified privilege on the basis of this overwhelming public 
interest.”59 The court also observed that “[c]onstructive 
professional criticism cannot occur in an atmosphere of 
apprehension” that such materials might be used against the 
organization in subsequent litigation.60 
Thus in Bredice, a court recognized for the first time 
that there was a strong public interest in allowing the free 
discussion of information in socially useful critical self-
examination, and that if discovery of such materials were 
allowed, the flow of information would halt.  
1. Early Recognition in the Employment Context 
Consideration of the self-critical analysis privilege in 
the employment context soon followed in a 1971 case before a 
Georgia district court.61 In Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., the 
defendant company in a race discrimination action sought to 
withhold the reports of an internal team appointed to study 
affirmative action issues, the results of which were 
incorporated into the company’s formal submission to the 
Department of Defense Contracts Compliance Program.62 The 
court held that plaintiffs were not entitled to the team reports 
when such reports have been made in an attempt to affirmatively 
strengthen the Company’s policy of compliance with Title VII and 
Executive Order 11246. The Court looks on this as an important 
issue of public policy and feels it would be contrary to that policy to 
discourage frank self-criticism and evaluation in the development of 
affirmative action programs of this kind.63 
Other courts in the years immediately following the 
Banks case similarly declined to require disclosure of internal 
assessments that companies had undertaken as part of their 
affirmative action reporting requirements. For example, in 
Dickerson v. U.S. Steel Corp., a Pennsylvania district court 
held that corporate documents containing goals and timetables 
  
 59 Id.; see also Brad Bacon, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis: Encouraging 
Recognition of the Misunderstood Privilege, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL. 221, 221 (1999). 
 60 Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 250. 
 61 Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 53 F.R.D. 283, 284 (N.D. Ga. 1971). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 285. 
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for affirmative action programs that were prepared in 
conjunction with federal reporting requirements were not 
discoverable, noting, “[d]isclosure of such subjective 
information could discourage employers from making the 
candid internal evaluations that the affirmative action 
program envisions. . . . Under these circumstances we hold that 
the public policy against disclosure outweigh the plaintiffs’ 
need for these materials.”64 
Similarly, in Sanday v. Carnegie Mellon University, 
another Pennsylvania district court held that the defendant’s 
affirmative action plans were not discoverable and observed, 
“[i]n view of governmental requirements which foster candid 
reflection and internal evaluation we firmly believe that such 
policy determinations, while possible [sic] relevant, should not 
be made available to party litigants for the simple reason that 
the primary purpose behind such regulation may be destroyed.”65 
In Stevenson v. General Electric, an Ohio district court 
likewise held that affirmative action reports were not 
discoverable in a discrimination suit. In reaching this 
conclusion, the court noted, “[t]he public policy behind these 
enactments mandates frank self-criticism and evaluation.”66 
The court acknowledged the decisions of other courts that had 
applied the privilege to such documents: “The courts 
determined that to allow discovery of these reports would deter 
this policy. We find the reasoning of these latter courts cogent 
and persuasive.”67  
Thus, employment documents appeared on track to enjoy 
equal footing with respect to the self-critical analysis privilege. 
2. The Webb/O’Connor Retreat 
However, in 1978, the courts began an abrupt pattern of 
reversal and retreat. In Webb v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., a 
Pennsylvania district court held that various employer 
documents—including notes from meetings where affirmative 
action and racial issues were discussed and internal studies 
  
 64 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1448, 1449 (E.D. Pa. 1976). 
 65 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 101, 103 (W.D. Pa. 1975). 
 66  Stevenson v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. C-1-77-122, 1978 WL 150, at *2 (S.D. Ohio 
Oct. 4, 1978). 
 67 Id.; see also McClain v. Mac Trucks, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 53, 58 (E.D. Pa. 1979) 
(holding that affirmative action plans were privileged and not discoverable); Rosario v. 
N.Y. Times Co., 84 F.R.D. 626, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
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assessing race discrimination in various phases of 
employment—were discoverable.68  
In reaching this conclusion, the Webb court delineated a 
three-part test to be used in determining whether the self-
critical analysis privilege applied to employment documents.69 
First, the court held that in order to be privileged, the 
documents must have been prepared as part of reporting that 
was mandated by the government, such as OFCCP affirmative 
action reports.70 Second, the court held that with respect to such 
mandatory reports, the privilege would only protect subjective 
portions of the analysis, and not any objective data contained 
therein.71 Finally, the test required that in determining the 
applicability of the privilege, courts should weigh the relative 
harm and benefit to be derived from disclosure, and deny 
discovery only where the detrimental effects of disclosure 
clearly outweighed the plaintiff’s need for the documents.72 The 
court admonished that, in undertaking this balancing test, it 
was necessary to be “sensitive to the need of the plaintiffs for 
such materials.”73 Applying the three factors to the documents at 
issue, the Webb court refused to find that those documents were 
privileged based on the fact that the company’s reports had been 
undertaken voluntarily and were not of the same mandatory 
nature as the OFCCP submission related documents in the 
earlier cases.74  
Though Webb began the retreat from recognition of the 
self-critical analysis privilege in the employment context, this 
retreat came to full force in 1980 with the decision of a 
Massachusetts district court in O’Connor v. Chrysler Corp.75 In 
O’Connor, the court held that the defendant employer in a sex 
discrimination case was required to disclose portions of both its 
affirmative action report and supporting documents that were 
based on objective data, as well as any subjective evaluations of 
fact that had been elsewhere disclosed.76 However, the 
  
 68 81 F.R.D. 431, 435 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
 69 Id. at 434. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 434-35; see also Roberts v. Nat’l Detroit Corp., 87 F.R.D. 30, 32 (E.D. 
Mich. 1980) (applying the Webb criteria and holding that only subjective portions of 
mandatory affirmative action reports are privileged). 
 75 86 F.R.D. 211 (D. Mass. 1980). 
 76 Id. at 218. 
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O’Connor court went further, holding that where documents 
combined objective data and critical self-evaluation, the 
employer would have the burden of creating new separate 
documents to disclose objective factual portions of those 
documents withheld.77  
In reaching its conclusion, the O’Connor court purported 
to adopt the three-part analysis established in Webb, 
acknowledging as a threshold matter that the documents at 
issue were mandatory government reports.78 The court also 
conceded that portions of the documents contained subjective 
analysis, thus meeting the second criteria for application of the 
privilege.79 The court then turned to the Webb balancing 
analysis, considering whether equal employment opportunity 
would be better served by maintaining the confidentiality of 
the documents or requiring their disclosure.80 The court 
recognized that “[a] lack of confidentiality almost inevitably 
will result in some cramping of the investigative process, 
simply because the incentives for any institution to engage in 
self-evaluative investigation pale considerably with the 
knowledge that the results may be used against it.”81  
However, the court appeared to discount any value that 
maintaining confidentiality might have, noting, “subjecting the 
evaluative conclusions contained in [affirmative action plans] 
to discovery would not necessarily greatly deter future self-
evaluations or substantially reduce their thoroughness.”82 The 
court reasoned that since the evaluations undertaken for 
affirmative action reporting were mandatory, they would still 
occur even with the knowledge the information would be 
disclosed.83 Further, while acknowledging that the possibility of 
disclosure might decrease the incentives for candid reporting, 
the court concluded that such concerns were not sufficient to 
justify withholding the documents because there were other 
deterrents to candor in self-evaluation, even absent discovery.84  
Webb and O’Connor represent a significant break from 
the earlier recognition of the self-critical analysis in the 
  
 77 Id. at 219. 
 78 Id. at 217. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id.  
 81 Id. at 217-18. 
 82  Id. at 217. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
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employment context. Armed with these decisions, courts began 
to reject the self-critical analysis privilege for employment 
documents. For example, in Resnick v. American Dental 
Association, a federal district court in Illinois held that a 
personnel practices study performed by an outside consulting 
firm and documents produced by defendant’s employee 
relations committee were not privileged.85  
Courts also began to reject application of the privilege to 
the subjective portion of mandatory affirmative action reports, 
which had been consistently recognized as privileged in the 
jurisprudence before that point. For example, in Witten v. A.H. 
Smith & Company, a federal district court in Maryland held 
that the subjective portions of an affirmative action submission 
were not privileged.86 The court first purported to consider the 
Webb analysis.87 However, despite the mandatory and 
subjective nature of the documents at issue, the court turned to 
the O’Connor holding to quickly conclude that, in light of the 
other deterrents to candid reporting that may exist, there was 
little value in maintaining confidentiality of affirmative action 
reports.88 Similarly, in Hardy v. New York News, Inc., a federal 
district court in New York held that documents prepared in 
conjunction with affirmative action reporting, even where 
subjective, were not protected.89  
C. The Supreme Court Weighs In 
Twenty years after the recognition of the self-critical 
analysis privilege in Bredice, the Supreme Court addressed the 
issue for the first time in University of Pennsylvania v. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission.90 Focused narrowly on 
the facts of the case, which are not analogous to the claims and 
documents at issue in the majority of employment 
discrimination cases, the Supreme Court’s holding in 
University of Pennsylvania did little to clearly define the 
privilege or even confirm its existence. Notwithstanding the 
limited utility of this decision, courts have embraced it as the 
rule with respect to the self-critical analysis privilege in the 
  
 85 95 F.R.D. 372, 374-75 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
 86 100 F.R.D. 446, 453-54 (D. Md. 1984), aff’d, 785 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 87 Id. at 450-51. 
 88 Id. at 451, 453. 
 89 114 F.R.D. 633, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 90 493 U.S. 182 (1990). 
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employment context, with the majority of courts interpreting 
the case to reject the privilege wholesale. 
In the case, which involved a sex discrimination claim 
by a faculty member who was denied tenure, the EEOC 
demanded production of peer review statements contained in 
tenure files, and the university sought modification of the 
EEOC subpoena based on the “intrusive effects” that disclosure 
of such materials would have.91 The EEOC denied the request 
and applied to the district court for enforcement of its 
subpoena, which the court ordered and the Third Circuit 
affirmed.92 The Supreme Court took the question of whether, as 
urged by the university, it should “recognize a qualified 
common-law privilege against disclosure of confidential peer 
review materials . . . necessary to protect the integrity of the 
peer review process, which in turn is central to the proper 
functioning of many colleges and universities.”93  
The Court held that such documents were not protected 
by privilege.94 In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that 
it does not recognize a new “evidentiary privilege unless it 
‘promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need 
for probative evidence . . . .’”95 The Court further observed that 
“Congress, in extending Title VII to educational institutions 
and in providing for broad EEOC subpoena powers, did not see 
fit to create a privilege for peer review documents.”96  
Despite the unique factual circumstances and narrow 
language of the Court’s holding, lower courts seemed to take 
University of Pennsylvania as a broad mandate to reject the 
self-critical analysis privilege in the employment context. In 
the years since the decision, courts declined to recognize the 
self-critical analysis privilege with respect to a broad spectrum 
of employment documents, including: affirmative action reports 
and supporting documents;97 assessments prepared by outside 
consultants in support of affirmative action reports;98 
  
 91 Id. at 186. 
 92 Id. at 187. 
 93 Id. at 188-89. 
 94 Id. at 189. 
 95 Id. (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)). 
 96 Id. 
 97 Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 885 F. Supp. 1434, 1440 (D. Kan. 1995); Tharp v. 
Sivyer Steel Corp., 149 F.R.D. 177, 185 (S.D. Iowa 1993); Martin v. Potomac Elec. 
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conclusions of a voluntary diversity committee regarding 
diversity efforts;99 investigations into internal complaints of 
discrimination;100 materials related to the development of a 
sexual harassment policy;101 employee statements regarding 
diversity in employee relations surveys;102 documents related to 
the impact of a reduction in force;103 an affirmative action study 
on compensation;104 and charts analyzing disciplinary actions by 
demographics.105 
Despite the strong trend toward rejection of the self-
critical analysis privilege in the employment context, a small 
number of courts continue to recognize the validity of the 
privilege with respect to employment documents. For example, 
in Flynn v. Goldman Sachs & Co., a federal district court in 
New York held that documents from a consultant’s study on 
barriers to women in the workplace, including interviews with 
employees and the final report to the client company, were 
privileged.106 The court observed that: 
[C]ommunications [with] . . . the interviewed employees were made 
with the understanding that any comments would be kept 
confidential and anonymous . . . [and] that such confidentiality is 
critically important to eliciting candid responses from employees 
about their concerns. Dissemination . . . even in redacted form, 
would have a chilling effect on the future willingness of employees 
. . . to speak candidly about sensitive topics . . . .107  
With respect to the final report, the court observed, “[f]ew, if 
any companies would risk commissioning a candid . . . report if 
these reports could later be used against the company in 
litigation. The goal of eliminating any barriers . . . is well 
served by encouraging such self-critical assessments.”108 
Similarly, in Sheppard v. Con Edison, another federal 
district court in New York held that documents voluntarily 
  
 99 Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 199 F.R.D. 379, 386 (N.D. Ga. 2001); 
Vanek v. Nutrasweet Co., No. 92 C 0115, 1992 WL 133162, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 1992). 
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studying affirmative action and reflecting employee comments 
on same were privileged, noting, “[s]uch a practice would not 
only curtail the flow of such information, but may also diminish 
the value of the information if companies are too skeptical of 
memorializing their analysis and thus fail to circulate the 
information . . . .”109  
The handful of other courts that continue to recognize 
the privilege in the employment context have echoed these 
policy rationales.110 As one court noted in holding that an 
internal study was privileged, “[t]his is precisely the type of 
evaluative and analytical exercise in which the public has a 
strong interest in encouraging corporations to engage . . . .”111 
III. REASONS UNDERLYING THE CONTINUING REJECTION OF 
THE SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE 
Despite the fact that a few courts have continued to 
recognize the application of the self-critical analysis privilege 
with respect to employment documents such as diversity 
studies, the trend in the past thirty years has been one of 
overwhelming rejection. The present situation with respect to 
the self-critical analysis privilege in the employment context 
may be described as tenuous and uncertain at best. The 
inability of companies to rely upon the privilege has significant 
and wide-ranging implications for diversity initiatives, and 
ultimately for workforce relations. 
To understand the scope of the problem, it is necessary to 
revisit the purpose of the privilege: If consistently recognized, 
the self-critical analysis privilege would permit companies to 
engage in rigorous self-examination, with an eye toward 
detection and prevention of potential problems, remediation of 
existing issues, and proactive implementation of new initiatives. 
This would result in an enhancement in diversity, in terms of 
both demographics and culture, as well as improvements in 
workplace relations and morale.112 However, when the privilege 
is unavailable or uncertain, as it is now, companies are less 
likely to undertake voluntary assessments that may reveal 
  
 109 893 F. Supp. 6, 8 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). 
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problems, and are reluctant to engage in the deeper levels of 
assessment that could result in institutional reform.113  
Given the ambiguous state of the law, employers are left 
unable to predict with any certainty whether materials will be 
protected. This uncertainty leaves them with the necessary 
assumption that they will not. In the absence of the privilege, 
companies face a dilemma: Should they engage in the self-
examination needed to affect change and improve employee 
relations, but risk creating a trail of documents and evidence 
that could wind up in court as evidence against them? 
Confronted with this Hobson’s choice, companies will generally 
choose to protect themselves from litigation, doing the 
minimally required amount of self-analysis, refraining from 
asking the hard questions, and putting a gloss on the data and 
results.114 Thus, they are greatly hindered, or in some cases 
deterred outright, from engaging in self-examination of a 
nature and scope that could result in meaningful change.115  
A further effect of the rejection of the self-critical 
analysis privilege in favor of blanket disclosure is to stifle 
discourse in the workplace. Companies are reluctant to allow 
employee groups to have candid dialogue where the discussions 
and any documents resulting from them are then fair game in 
subsequent employment law suits. Additionally, the chilling 
effect extends beyond the corporate decision makers to 
individual employees, who may be reticent to come forward and 
speak freely if they fear disclosure.116 Thus, the complaints of a 
few litigious individuals are allowed to stymie the larger 
dialogue that can benefit the workforce as a whole.  
The deep and far-reaching implications of this problem 
demand remediation of the current state of the law. 
In order to address the problems that arise from the 
failure to recognize the self-critical analysis privilege in the 
employment context, it is first necessary to understand the 
causes of the rejection. The first is courts’ undue and overly 
broad reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in University of 
Pennsylvania, a case that, upon closer examination, proves to 
be factually distinguishable from the issue of self-critical 
  
 113 See David P. Leonard, Codifying a Privilege for Self-Critical Analysis, 25 
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analysis, with a holding that is narrow in scope and therefore 
of limited value to the larger issue of employment documents.  
Second, the courts’ rejection of the self-critical analysis 
privilege may be attributed to a preference for bright-line 
distinctions that protect only documents that are prepared 
pursuant to mandatory government reporting and that contain 
only subjective analysis. Such misapplication ignores the need 
for the more nuanced balancing test required by the Wigmore 
privilege analysis and unduly excludes a large number of 
documents from protection.  
Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, the current 
state of the law with respect to self-critical analysis privilege 
fails to recognize the changes that have taken place in 
employment law over the last two decades, through which 
preventative measures, self-identification of issues, and prompt 
remediation of the same have become some of the most 
important weapons in combating discrimination. This 
framework shift, which has been expressly sanctioned by the 
Supreme Court in more recent cases stressing the importance 
of preventative measures, necessitates recognition of the self-
critical analysis privilege for documents such as diversity 
studies in order to enable employers to study and ferret out 
potential organizational issues without fear that their 
initiatives will increase liability.  
By looking at these cases, as well as the faulty 
assumptions underpinning the lower courts’ rationale in the 
existing cases addressing self-critical analysis, it becomes clear 
that the privilege can—and should—be recognized in the 
employment context. 
A. Undue Reliance on University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC 
The genesis of the courts’ present widespread rejection 
of the self-critical analysis privilege in the employment context 
can be traced to the Supreme Court’s decision in University of 
Pennsylvania v. EEOC.117 As set forth more fully below in 
Section II.B.3.d, the court in that case rejected the university’s 
argument that peer assessments that were conducted as part of 
a tenure review process and later were challenged in a race and 
sex discrimination case should be protected as privileged from 
  
 117 493 U.S. 182 (1990). 
590 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:2 
an EEOC subpoena.118 In the absence of other, more explicit 
instruction on the issue, courts have taken this decision as a 
signal that the self-critical analysis privilege should not be 
recognized with respect to employment documents generally, 
even those that relate to diversity. 
However, a closer look at the case makes clear that its 
application to the broader issue of the self-critical analysis 
privilege in the employment context is of limited utility. First, 
University of Pennsylvania involved a dispute over peer 
reviews related to one faculty member’s candidacy for tenure.119 
These documents, which are in essence performance 
evaluations of an individual employee, are in no way 
equivalent to the corporate diversity documents containing 
self-examination of institutional demographics generally at 
issue in employment discrimination cases.  
Moreover, in the University of Pennsylvania case, the 
peer reviews sought by the plaintiff reflected in part the 
employer’s justification for the very employment decision 
alleged in the case to be discriminatory, that is, the decision 
not to grant tenure.120 Thus, they were highly relevant to the 
plaintiff’s individual claim. Conversely, the diversity 
documents that companies typically seek to protect by invoking 
the self-critical analysis privilege in employment cases tend to 
be circumstantial evidence at best, sought by the plaintiff to 
show an institutional pattern or practice of discrimination. 
They are typically only tangentially related to the specific 
issues in the case and marginally relevant. 
Thus, the facts of the University of Pennsylvania case 
are so inapposite as to render the case of limited applicability 
to the broader question of whether the self-critical analysis 
privilege should be recognized with respect to employment 
documents such as diversity studies. The Court implicitly 
recognized these significant differences in the narrow language 
of its holding: “With all this in mind, we cannot accept the 
University’s invitation to create a new privilege against the 
disclosure of peer review materials.”121 Courts, however, have 
misperceived the lack of alternative guidance as to how the 
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self-critical analysis privilege should be applied in the 
employment context and have failed to recognize this case for 
what it is—a tangential guidepost that does not squarely 
address the issue of employment documents. 
B. Discomfort with the Wigmore Balancing Test 
A second reason for the courts’ reluctance to apply the 
self-critical analysis privilege in the employment context is 
discomfort with the balancing test it requires. In his test for 
determining the applicability of a privilege, Wigmore 
articulated four criteria to be considered: (1) the 
communications must have been made in confidence; (2) 
confidentiality must be essential to the relationship between 
the parties; (3) the relation must be one which the community 
seeks to foster; and (4) the injury that would ensue to the 
relationship by disclosure of the communication must be 
greater than the benefit thereby gained.122 Instead of adopting 
this test, many courts have employed the Webb analysis in 
applying the privilege to employment documents. However, as 
established below, the Webb test is a flawed and problematic 
way to assess the applicability of the privilege. 
Applying the first three Wigmore factors to employment 
documents such as diversity studies, it is clear that the self-
critical analysis privilege should be recognized in most cases. 
First, diversity studies, if they are undertaken with any serious 
value or intent, must be confidential in order to capture full 
and accurate information about a company’s issues. 
Additionally, confidentiality is essential, as employees are 
unlikely to speak candidly without assurances of such 
discretion. Further, improved workforce relations and diversity 
are goals that society seeks to encourage.  
The only question, then, is to the fourth factor, the 
harm-versus-benefit balancing analysis. While the first three 
criteria may be contemplated with respect to diversity studies 
generally, this final factor must be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis, the outcome dependent upon the nature of the 
documents sought, their function within the company and the 
relationship to a plaintiff’s claims. Thus, the heart of the 
court’s role with respect to a privilege determination lies in 
considering this balancing test and weighing the relative 
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benefit and harm that would result from disclosure of the 
documents—that is, analyzing whether the societal aims would 
be better preserved in a particular case by disclosing the 
information or preserving the confidential relationship.  
The balancing test for the self-critical analysis privilege 
does not differ significantly from that which courts undertake 
when assessing other qualified privileges. However, when 
applying other privileges, courts are armed with decades of 
well-established precedent and policy rationale, which provide 
guideposts as to the situations in which the privilege should 
apply. The self-critical analysis privilege is comparatively new 
and the cases applying it are sparse and inconsistent. In the 
employment context, the lack of clear guidance is exacerbated 
by the changing landscape of the law and competing aims of 
providing plaintiffs with access to material with which to 
redress their grievances while ensuring that other means of 
promoting nondiscrimination, such as self-examination and 
open dialogue, are preserved.  
The complex nature of applying this balancing analysis 
to the determination of self-critical analysis in the employment 
context has resulted in courts defaulting to other, more bright-
line tests, most notably the criteria set forth by the district 
court in Webb. The Webb analysis requires a court to consider 
somewhat different factors than Wigmore’s analysis. 
Specifically, Webb provides that in order for the privilege to 
apply in the employment context: (1) the documents must have 
been prepared for mandatory government reports; (2) the 
documents must contain subjective analysis rather than 
objective facts or data; and (3) courts should be “sensitive” to 
the needs of the plaintiffs for such material and deny discovery 
only where the policy favoring exclusion of the materials 
clearly outweighed the plaintiff’s need.123  
Courts have embraced the Webb analysis as a way to 
assess the applicability of the privilege to employment 
documents such as diversity studies. However, it is not at all 
clear that application of the criteria articulated by the Webb 
court is relevant or appropriate. Indeed, a closer examination 
reveals that this test is flawed on a number of levels.  
First, the consideration of whether the documents in 
question were drafted voluntarily or pursuant to mandatory 
government analysis is an artificial distinction. It runs 
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contrary to the very purpose of the self-critical analysis 
privilege—to encourage candid self-examination. Voluntary 
self-assessment is exactly the type of behavior that the 
privilege is entitled to foster, even more so than self-
examination mandated by laws or regulations, which already 
contain incentives in the form of penalties for noncompliance. 
Conversely, voluntary self-assessment requires the cloak of 
privilege; otherwise the reward is little, the risk great, and the 
incentive none.  
Whether the decision to undertake an analysis is made 
voluntarily or required by law, the privilege should apply. 
Candor is an essential element of self-analysis—it is essential 
not only to the desire to undertake analysis, but also to the 
quality and rigor of the analysis. Without the certainty of a 
privilege, the depth of such studies will surely be reduced to a 
level that is essentially worthless.  
The second criteria articulated by the Webb court, that 
the documents for which protection is sought must contain 
subjective analysis in order to be privileged, also fails to 
survive scrutiny. Proponents of such a distinction claim that 
the subjective analysis is the only truly self-critical portion of 
the documents and that the objective data are just numbers 
and statistics that should be available to litigants.124 
This distinction is invalid for a number of reasons. First, 
the division between objective data and subjective analysis 
worked adequately when the documents at issue were 
primarily OFCCP affirmative action reports, such that the 
types of data sought were mandated by the government 
reporting requirements. However, in corporate diversity 
studies, the decision as to which data to compile—that is, 
which aspects of the business have the need for study and 
improvement—is left to the company to decide. Because that 
initial determination is intrinsically self-critical and subjective, 
that determination should be privileged.  
Additionally, when OFCCP reports were the primary 
documents at issue, it was relatively easy to parse out the 
objective data from the subjective analysis based on the 
required reporting structure. This is hardly the case with 
corporate diversity analyses, in which the distinctions blur and 
the objective and subjective portions of studies comingle. The 
  
 124  See generally Deason, supra note 52; James F. Flanagan, Rejecting a 
General Privilege for Self-Critical Analysis, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 551, 559 (1983). 
594 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:2 
approach some courts have taken to this problem has been that 
which originated in the O’Connor125 case: requiring companies 
to create new documents parsing out the objective data from 
diversity studies.126 This “solution” imposes a burden well 
beyond the scope of that which is permitted by the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.127 
Notwithstanding the flawed assumptions underlying 
these first two criteria, many courts applying the Webb analysis 
have based their determination of privilege on one or both.128 Not 
surprisingly, they have frequently concluded that employment 
documents such as diversity studies are not protected by the 
self-critical analysis privilege, either because they were not 
prepared pursuant to government mandate or because they 
contain objective data.129 By reaching this conclusion based on 
the first two criteria, courts have managed to avoid the need to 
engage in the third portion of the analysis—weighing the harm 
of disclosure against the benefits of disclosure—altogether. 
However, this preference for a black-and-white determination 
over the balancing analysis is a misstep that undermines the 
very nature and purposes of the privilege. 
Moreover, even where courts do get to the third prong of 
the Webb analysis, their utilization of the balancing test 
articulated in that case, which purports to consider the same 
relative harm-versus-benefit of disclosure required by 
Wigmore, still results in erroneous conclusions. Using the Webb 
test is problematic because it places a higher burden on the 
party seeking to invoke the privilege. Under the Wigmore 
conceptualization, the party seeking to keep the documents 
privileged must show that the harm from disclosure is greater 
than the benefit.130 However, Webb has raised the standard to 
require a court to conclude that the harm from disclosure 
“clearly outweighed” the benefit.131 This heightened standard, 
coupled with the Webb court’s admonition that courts must be 
“sensitive” to the needs of the plaintiffs, results in rejection of 
the privilege with undue frequency.  
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C. Failure to Recognize the Changing Landscape of 
Employment Law 
Perhaps the most fundamental reason for the courts’ 
rejection of the self-critical analysis privilege is their failure to 
recognize the changing landscape of employment law. Courts 
rejecting the privilege rationalize that, if it is recognized, big 
companies will use it as a shield to prevent individuals from 
obtaining the evidence necessary to seek redress of their claims. 
However, by relying upon this model (Goliath-company-versus-
David-plaintiff in litigation), courts are ignoring the important 
developments that have occurred in the realm of employment 
discrimination jurisprudence in the past several decades.  
First, it is clear that litigation is not the only, or even 
the primary, means of redress. Indeed, it is estimated that only 
three to four percent of employment discrimination cases ever 
go to trial.132 The overwhelming majority are resolved through 
settlement, mediation, or other nonbinding resolution.  
More importantly, the courts’ assumption ignores the fact 
that most discrimination issues, if properly handled, need not 
ever get to the litigation stage. Rather, in recent years there has 
been increased emphasis on the employer’s affirmative steps to 
prevent and remediate discrimination. This is reflected in a trio 
of Supreme Court cases from the late 1990s: Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton,133 Burlington Industries v. Ellerth,134 and Kolstad v. 
American Dental Association.135 In these cases, the Court placed 
a strong emphasis on exactly the types of preventative and 
remedial measures that self-critical analysis privilege is 
intended to, and can most effectively, foster.136  
The first two decisions arose out of a federal circuit 
court split over the standard for employer liability in hostile 
work environment claims, with some courts holding that 
employers were strictly liable for such claims, and others 
requiring actual or constructive knowledge of the unlawful 
  
 132 Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 123 n.60 
(2009); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 438-39 (2004). 
 133  524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 134  524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 135 527 U.S. 526 (1999). 
 136 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 777, 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 768, 770; Kolstad, 527 
U.S. at 528, 545-46. 
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conduct.137 In Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, a former 
employee claimed she was sexually harassed by her 
supervisor.138 The district court dismissed—holding that 
because the plaintiff had never complained, the company 
neither knew nor should have known about the harassment—
and the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the company liable.139 
The Supreme Court held that, with respect to a hostile work 
environment claim, the employer may utilize a two-pronged 
defense to liability by establishing “(a) that the employer 
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any 
sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or 
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid 
harm otherwise.”140  
Similarly, in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, a part-time 
lifeguard alleged that two of her three supervisors subjected her 
to a sexually hostile atmosphere, which included inappropriate 
comments, uninvited touching, and offensive speech.141 As in 
Ellerth, the plaintiff did not complain.142 However, in this case, the 
company had failed to distribute its harassment policy.143 The 
district court found in favor of the plaintiff on the basis that the 
supervisors were acting as agents of the employer, but the 
Eleventh Circuit reversed, determining that the harassers were 
acting outside of the scope of their employment.144 The Supreme 
Court found the that city had not exercised reasonable care in 
preventing harassing conduct on the part of its supervisors, 
basing this holding on the district court’s determination that the 
city “had entirely failed to disseminate its [sexual harassment] 
policy [and] . . . made no attempt to keep track of the conduct of 
[its] supervisors.”145 The Court also held that the harassment 
policy was inadequate because it did not provide a means for 
employees to bypass their supervisors when making complaints.146 
  
 137 Erin Arndale, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Wake of 
Faragher and Ellerth, 9 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 585, 591-93 (2000). 
 138 524 U.S. at 747. 
 139 Id. at 749. 
 140 Id. at 765. 
 141 524 U.S. at 780-81. 
 142  Id. at 782. 
 143 Id.; Arndale, supra note 137, at 595. 
 144 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 783. 
 145 Id. at 808. 
 146 Id. 
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The Court concluded that since the city did not exercise 
reasonable care, it could not exercise a defense to liability.147 
Faragher and Ellerth made clear for the first time that 
an employer had an affirmative duty to prevent, investigate, 
and remediate allegations of discrimination, and indeed that in 
doing so it could provide itself with an affirmative defense to 
discrimination suits. These principles were reiterated by the 
Supreme Court the following year in Kolstad v. American 
Dental Association.148 In Kolstad, a female employee sued the 
American Dental Association for promoting a male colleague 
over her, and demonstrated that the employee in charge of the 
promotion decision made sexually offensive jokes and 
remarks.149 The district court found for Kolstad but refused to 
instruct the jury on punitive damages and she appealed.150 The 
D.C. Circuit held that the jury should have been instructed on 
punitive damages based on the lower court’s finding that the 
employer had acted with malice or reckless indifference.151 The 
appellate court reheard the case en banc and again affirmed 
the district court’s holding, concluding that in order to award 
punitive damages, there must have been egregious conduct.152  
The Supreme Court considered the issue and held 7-2 
that conduct need not be egregious in order to support a 
punitive damages award.153 Rather, a plaintiff only need show 
that an employer acted, “in the face of a perceived risk that its 
actions will violate federal law to be liable in punitive 
damages.”154 However, the Court created a good faith 
compliance defense under which punitive liability can be 
avoided by showing that the employer implemented measures 
to prevent, detect, and remediate discrimination and 
harassment.155 The Court noted that “[d]issuading employers 
from implementing programs or policies to prevent 
discrimination in the workplace is directly contrary to the 
  
 147 See Nancy R. Mansfield & Joan T.A. Gabel, An Analysis of the Burlington and 
Faragher Affirmative Defense: When Are Employers Liable? 19 LAB. L. 107, 113 (2003). 
 148 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999). 
 149 Id. at 530-31. 
 150 Id. at 532.  
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 152 Id. at 533. 
 153 Id. at 547. 
 154 Id. at 536; see also David D. Powell, Jr. & Catherine C. Crane, Complying with 
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 155 Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 545-46; see also Tamara Schiffner, Employment Law: 
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purposes underlying Title VII. The statute’s ‘primary objective’ 
is ‘a prophylactic one’ . . . .”156  
These cases represent an express recognition by the 
Supreme Court that Title VII was intended to encourage 
preventive, conciliatory measures over litigation.157 As the 
Court observed in Faragher, “[a]lthough Title VII seeks ‘to 
make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of 
unlawful employment discrimination, its ‘primary objective,’ 
like that of any statute meant to influence primary conduct, is 
not to provide redress but to avoid harm.”158 The Court went on 
to point to the regulations that instruct employees on how to 
raise complaints, observing: 
It would therefore implement clear statutory policy and complement 
the Government’s Title VII enforcement efforts to recognize the 
employer’s affirmative obligation to prevent violations and give 
credit here to employers who make reasonable efforts to discharge 
their duty. Indeed, a theory of vicarious liability for misuse of 
supervisory power would be at odds with the statutory policy if it 
failed to provide employers with some such incentive.159 
Thus, the Supreme Court’s guidance in these cases makes clear 
that preventative measures are a primary objective of federal 
antidiscrimination law.  
These cases had significant impact on employers; 
indeed, it is not an overstatement to say that they reshaped the 
landscape of employment law. With this trilogy of decisions, 
the Supreme Court extended the protection afforded to 
employers who made good faith efforts to comply with federal 
discrimination laws by recognizing such proactive measures as 
both a defense to liability and punitive damages. This greatly 
increased the incentive for employers to implement preventive 
measures such as nondiscrimination policies and training. 
Courts following Kolstad have considered several factors as 
elements of the good-faith defense, such as: (1) a 
comprehensive nondiscrimination/nonharassment policy, which 
includes a complaints mechanism that is well-publicized and 
readily available; coupled with (2) mandatory training for 
  
 156 Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 545 (emphasis added) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)). 
 157 Amy L. Blaisdell, A New Standard of Employer Liability Emerges: Kolstad 
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 158  Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Albermarle, 422 U.S. at 417-18). 
 159 Id. at 806. 
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managers on their duty to act swiftly when they have 
knowledge of claims; (3) prompt investigation of all complaints; 
and (4) remedial measures where complaints are 
substantiated.160 Thus, employers are tasked not only with 
ensuring that a comprehensive antiharassment policy is 
implemented, but also that preventative and remedial 
measures are effective.161  
Thus, preventative measures as endorsed by the Court 
have become imbedded as an integral part of corporate 
culture.162 Such measures can most effectively be tailored when 
they are based on an organization’s assessment of its issues 
and needs. However, companies can not engage in this self-
analysis with the rigor that is warranted in order to make it 
effective unless they can do so with the certainty that the 
results are not going to wind up in litigation.  
These cases set up a framework to encourage employers 
to engage in self-examination in order to minimize liability and 
to detect and fix problems before they arise. In light of this 
guidance, courts need to reevaluate the importance of providing 
confidentiality by way of the self-critical analysis privilege. The 
courts’ unwillingness to infer the privilege should therefore be 
reexamined. 
IV. RECOGNITION OF THE SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
PRIVILEGE IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT 
To remedy courts’ mistaken rejection of the self-critical 
analysis privilege in the employment context, the narrow 
confines of Webb should be rejected in favor of the precedent set 
by more recent and applicable Supreme Court precedent. 
Critics argue that the privilege is unnecessary and obstructs 
employee and government efforts to address discrimination. 
However, unlike the protections of the existing recognized 
privileges, the self-critical analysis privilege recognized in the 
employment context ultimately supports the larger goal of 
preventing employee discrimination. 
  
 160 Powell & Crane, supra note 154, at 594-95, 619-20. 
 161 Richelle Wise Kidder, A Conciliatory Approach to Workplace Harassment: 
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A. Proposal for the Recognition of the Privilege 
Having established that the current situation—
infrequent and uncertain recognition of the self-critical 
analysis privilege in the employment context—is based on 
erroneous assumptions and creates a situation that is not 
conducive to fostering diversity and positive workplace 
relations, an alternative proposal must be offered. Some 
commentators have suggested a legislative or administrative 
solution, in which the self-critical analysis privilege might be 
codified by statute or amendment to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.163 However, the fact that the evolution of privileges in 
federal jurisprudence has primarily been a matter of common 
law, coupled with the cumbersome nature of the legislative and 
rule-making processes, suggests that this may not be the most 
timely or effective solution. Additionally, despite the latitude 
provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts are generally 
reluctant to recognize new privileges164 or to expand the bounds 
of existing ones, due in large part to the presumption that 
litigants should have access to “every man’s evidence.”165  
Of course, ideally the Supreme Court would issue a new 
decision—one that explicitly revisits and clarifies the 
applicability of the self-critical analysis privilege in the 
employment context in light of the changing nature of 
employment law and the Court’s more recent decisions 
emphasizing the importance of preventative measures. 
However, given that there are presently no cases addressing 
this issue pending before the Court, this resolution seems 
neither imminent nor likely. 
Fortunately, courts do not need further legislative or 
Supreme Court guidance in order to properly address this 
issue. Rather, they simply need to revisit the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence that has evolved subsequent to the University of 
Pennsylvania case, primarily Faragher, Ellerth, and Kolstad.166 
These cases make clear that prevention of employment 
discrimination is a primary objective of Title VII, and 
companies need to be incentivized and rewarded for taking 
proactive steps such as self-examination of policies, procedures, 
  
 163 Leonard, supra note 113, at 122-23. 
 164 See, e.g., Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990). 
 165 WIGMORE, supra note 48, at 70. 
 166 Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999); Faragher v. City of Boca 
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demographics, workplace culture, and other diversity and 
equality issues.  
Having established that the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence not only provides a basis, but indeed a mandate, 
for recognition of the self-critical analysis privilege with respect 
to employment documents such as diversity studies, the 
question becomes: What should that privilege look like?  
First, it is clear that the narrow confines of the Webb 
analysis should be discarded. Specifically, the limitation that 
only documents produced as a result of mandatory government 
reporting should be protected by the privilege is outmoded and 
without merit. The instruction, established by the more recent 
Supreme Court cases, that companies engage in proactive 
behavior to identify and remedy discrimination, requires that 
they engage in self-examination well beyond the reporting 
requirements that some companies as federal contractors are 
required to undertake. Indeed, voluntary self-analysis is at the 
very heart of the kind of preventive compliance to ensure a 
discrimination-free workplace that both Title VII and the 
Supreme Court cases interpreting the statute intended. Thus, 
voluntary self-examination should be given the same protection 
as mandatory reports. 
Similarly, the distinction created in Webb—whereby 
documents or portions of documents containing subjective 
analysis should be protected while the objective portions of 
such documents must be produced—should be abolished. 
Companies should not be required to disclose objective portions 
of self-critical studies where the studies involved a 
determination as to which data should be included and how it 
should be tabulated—decisions that are in themselves 
subjective self-critical analysis and an integral part of the self-
examination process.  
Stripped of the confines and artificial strictures of the 
Webb analysis, the question remains: How then should the 
applicability of self-critical analysis in employment cases be 
determined? The courts need to return to the Wigmore 
analysis, which lies at the heart of any assessment of privilege. 
Under this conceptualization, a court would first consider as a 
threshold matter: (1) the nature of the confidential 
relationship; (2) the value society places on the relationship; 
and (3) the expectation of privacy that was contemplated in 
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making the communication in question.167 In many, but not all, 
cases, these three factors will weigh in favor of protecting self-
examination undertaken by companies with respect to diversity 
in the workplace. In cases where one or more of these initial 
criteria are not met, the court should not protect the documents 
as privileged.  
In cases where these preliminary criteria are met, the 
court should focus its analysis on the fourth prong—the 
relative harm-versus-benefit of disclosure. This balancing test 
will allow the court to take into account nuanced 
considerations, such as the nature of the plaintiff’s claims 
relative to the types of documents sought, and make a 
determination of how the purpose of the law can best be served. 
The proposed privilege is not without its limitations and 
must contain several important parameters. First, where the 
conduct of the diversity committee and its reports are actually 
at issue in the case (for example, where the plaintiff alleges 
that the company’s diversity activities are in themselves 
discriminatory) the privilege would not apply.  
Additionally, where the defendant company puts its 
diversity initiatives at issue in the case, submitting, for example, 
a diversity study as evidence that is has not engaged in 
discriminatory practices, the privilege would be waived. As one 
court noted in holding that such documents were not protected,  
The court need not reach the privilege questions . . . the defendant has 
disseminated the affirmative action plan itself in response to public 
pressure regarding minority hiring. . . . In such circumstances, it must 
be concluded that defendant has waived any privilege to withhold 
information the business has already publicly disclosed voluntarily in 
the exercise of sound business judgment about how to diffuse protest 
aimed at the company.168 
B. Addressing the Critics 
Clearly, the proposal that the self-critical analysis 
privilege applies in the employment context is not without its 
detractors. Armed with decades of jurisprudence, critics 
contend that the privilege should not be recognized because: (1) 
other privileges or doctrines are sufficient to protect the 
documents;169 (2) recognition of the privilege would deny 
  
 167 WIGMORE, supra note 48, at 527. 
 168 Jamison v. Storer Broad. Co., 511 F. Supp. 1286, 1297 (E.D. Mich. 1981). 
 169 See Vandegrift, supra note 52, at 191. 
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litigants information needed to pursue claims and hamper 
government enforcement efforts;170 and (3) that the privilege 
would not go far enough to justify its creation. However, an 
examination of existing privilege law quickly demonstrates 
that it is insufficient to protect employment documents such as 
the diversity studies contemplated herein. Moreover, the well-
tailored privilege set forth in the proposal, when carefully 
applied, would not preclude plaintiffs or government agencies 
from obtaining the documents they need.  
1. Other Privileges Are Insufficient to Protect Diversity 
Documents 
Critics attempt to deny the validity of the self-critical 
analysis privilege in the employment context by claiming that it is 
not needed because other privileges and doctrines, such as 
attorney-client privilege, attorney work product, and the 
subsequent repairs doctrine, can cover any documents that should 
rightfully be protected. An examination of those mechanisms 
makes clear that they are insufficient to fulfill this purpose.  
For example, one suggested alternative to self-critical 
analysis privilege is that the attorney-client privilege, which 
protects communications between counsel and the party he or 
she represents, can protect employment documents in lieu of 
the self-critical analysis privilege.171 However, this privilege 
falls far short of protecting documents such as diversity 
studies.172 As an initial matter, the attorney-client privilege only 
applies where a client is seeking legal advice from counsel, but 
diversity analyses are often conducted by nonlegal personnel 
such as human resources or employee relations personnel.173 
Moreover, diversity studies do not solely or even primarily 
consist of the kind of legal advice that would be protected by 
attorney-client privilege, but cover a wide range of business 
topics including organizational dynamics and social and 
cultural issues.  
Additionally, with respect to the attorney-client privilege 
in the corporate context, there is a question of who is the client. 
Generally the protection of the privilege only extends to 
  
 170 Stephen C. Simpson, The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege in Employment 
Law, 21 J. CORP. L. 577, 589, 591 (1996). 
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corporate officers and supervisory personnel.174 Thus, 
communications by many of the participants in diversity studies, 
including the rank and file employees, would not be protected.175  
For similar reasons, the attorney work product doctrine, 
which protects documents containing the opinions, mental 
processes, and opinions of counsel, would not suffice to protect 
diversity documents.176 In addition to sharing the problem with 
attorney-client privilege that many diversity studies are not 
prepared by counsel, the attorney work product doctrine 
protects only documents prepared in anticipation of litigation—
the majority of diversity studies are undertaken proactively 
rather than in anticipation of litigation and therefore would fall 
outside the privilege’s protections.177 
Some commentators have suggested that self-
examination documents such as diversity studies might, in the 
alternative, find protection under Federal Rule of Evidence 
407, more commonly known as the subsequent remedial 
measures doctrine.178 As codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 
407, the doctrine provides: 
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, 
measures are taken that, if taken previously, would have made the 
injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent 
measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a 
defect in a product, a defect in a product’s design, or a need for a 
warning or instruction.179  
Thus, under Rule 407, remedial measures undertaken 
subsequent to an incident are not admissible for purposes of 
proving liability. This rule, however, will generally be 
insufficient to protect self-examination documents such as 
diversity studies. First, because it is not a privilege, but rather 
a rule regarding admissibility of evidence, the diversity 
documents will likely still be discoverable by adverse parties in 
litigation, even if deemed inadmissible at trial.180 The present 
chilling effects of discovery would therefore persist unabated. 
  
 174 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
 175 See id. 
 176 Leonard, supra note 113, at 122. 
 177 Id.  
 178 FED. R. EVID. 407.  
 179 Id. The Rule further notes that it “does not require the exclusion of 
evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving 
ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or 
impeachment.” Id.  
 180 Vandegrift, supra note 52, at 190. 
2011] THE CASE FOR CANDOR 605 
Further, the rule only protects studies or measures that are 
taken subsequent to an injury or claim, not those that are 
taken beforehand, as is the case with most diversity studies 
sought in litigation.181  
Notwithstanding the fact that Rule 407 is in itself 
insufficient to protect documents of the scope and nature of 
diversity studies, its rationale is helpful in understanding why 
such documents should be protected under the analogous self-
critical analysis privilege: “Rule 407 is designed to protect the 
important policy of encouraging defendants to repair and 
improve their products and premises without the fear that such 
actions will be used later against them in a lawsuit.”182 The 
rationale that protects documents related to measures taken 
after injury surely must apply with equal, if not greater, force 
to preventive measures designed to avoid harm in the first 
place, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s emphasis on 
such proactive steps.  
2. The Privilege Will Not Hamper Private Claims or 
Government Enforcement 
Perhaps most fundamentally, opponents express 
concern that application of the self-critical analysis privilege to 
employment documents such as diversity studies will preclude 
plaintiffs from obtaining the information they need to seek 
redress of their claims.183 This is an argument that could be 
made with respect to the self-critical analysis privilege in other 
areas of the law, or for that matter, with respect to any 
privilege at all. Taken to its utmost extreme, an argument such 
as this, which places overwhelming and undue emphasis on a 
litigant’s need for access to documents, would destroy the 
privileged relationships fundamental to our society by 
undermining well-established privileges such as the attorney-
client privilege and eliminating the societal benefit that flows 
from the candor in such privileged relationships.184 
Dealt with in the limited context of employment 
discrimination, however, this argument still does not undermine 
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recognition of the privilege. First, it is clear that the purpose and 
intent of Title VII, as articulated in the more recent Supreme 
Court cases, emphasize that preventive measures are to be 
valued, encouraged, and placed on at least equal—if not 
greater—footing with the need for an individual to redress his or 
her claims.185 If the critics’ argument is allowed to win the day, 
then the claims of individuals (the merits of which have not yet 
been assessed) would prevent institutional discourse and reform, 
to the detriment of the employees at large.  
Moreover, the proposed framework for the application of 
the self-critical analysis privilege to employment documents 
contemplates and addresses concerns about individual 
employees’ need for information to pursue their claims. The 
privilege is qualified subject to the balancing analysis set forth 
by Wigmore, which considers, on a case-by-case basis, the 
plaintiff’s need to have access to such information. Indeed, the 
balancing inquiry favors the rights of plaintiffs as it requires 
the harm of disclosure to outweigh the benefits before the 
privilege will apply, and places the burden on defendant 
companies to show why documents should be protected. 
Additionally, while plaintiffs may not have access to the self-
critical documents in cases where the privilege is properly 
applied and the balance tips in favor of non-disclosure, they are 
not precluded from obtaining any of the underlying data 
through well-crafted discovery requests.186 They also continue to 
have access through discovery to the myriad other information, 
including documents regarding their own employment, and, to 
the extent relevant, documents regarding comparable 
employees and the company at-large. 
Nor, as critics contend, will recognition of the self-
critical analysis privilege hamper government agencies in their 
enforcement roles.187 A carefully tailored application of the 
balancing test would still permit government agencies to obtain 
the mandatory reports and other documents to which they are 
entitled as a matter of law where appropriate, perhaps 
pursuant to a protective order to prevent further disclosure.188 
As with private plaintiffs, the Wigmore balancing test would 
also permit disclosure of self-examination documents to 
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governmental agencies where the company could not show that 
the harm of disclosure would outweigh the benefit.  
Finally, as at least one commentator has noted, there 
are benefits to government enforcement entitles from effective 
self-analysis: 
Potential advantages include helping businesses cut through often 
complex regulations by affording them a detailed breakdown of their 
operations (which also allows them to detect operational problems 
before they become more severe), and reducing the billions of dollars 
a year spent on governmental attempts to regulate industry.189 
Another observed that the privilege “should be expanded 
because it generates positive net social utility by facilitating 
corporate self-regulatory conduct at minimal social cost.”190 
3. Other Criticisms 
The proposal for a test that balances the benefits and 
harms of disclosure is also subject to criticism from those who do 
not feel it goes far enough. For example, some commentators 
have suggested that a balancing test does not provide enough 
certainty for companies and will not alleviate the chilling effects, 
instead proposing a blanket protection for internal corporate 
studies.191 Others have suggested, in a similar vein, that these 
studies be protected by a self-critical analysis privilege that is 
coextensive with the deliberative privilege enjoyed by 
governmental agencies with respect to their investigations.192 
These proposals, while conceived from the same impetus 
as the framework suggested herein—the desire to encourage 
socially beneficial self-examination by corporate actors—are 
simply not feasible. First, the notion of a blanket privilege for 
internal corporate studies fails to take into account the nature 
of a qualified privilege, which will be considered subject to the 
relative interests of the parties in a particular case and in light 
of the circumstances and policies implicated. Moreover, in the 
employment context, where the contemplation of privilege must 
take into account the competing objectives of Title VII of 
encouraging measures that prevent discrimination and 
allowing those who believe they have suffered discrimination 
  
 189 Id. 
 190 Bush, supra note 183, at 636-37. 
 191 See Pollard, supra note 18, at 1000-02. 
 192 Kellog, supra note 43, at 278-79. 
608 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:2 
redress of their claims, a blanket protection would not give 
sufficient consideration to the latter of these aims. 
Similarly, the notion that self-critical analysis should 
enjoy blanket protection tantamount to the governmental 
deliberative privilege goes too far. The role of the government 
in an investigation on behalf of a third party differs greatly, in 
terms of objectives and self-interest, from that of a defendant 
corporation in litigation, and the extent to which the two 
privileges respectively protect documents needs to reflect that 
important difference. 
Finally, some critics may argue that the implementation 
of the Wigmore criteria, which requires a case-by-case 
balancing of factors, will in fact result in more uncertainty than 
the bright-line approach adopted by courts that have embraced 
the Webb criteria. As an initial matter, it is clear that by 
eschewing the flawed distinctions inherent in the Webb criteria 
(that is, protecting mandatory studies but not voluntary ones 
and protecting subjective portions of reports but not “objective” 
data), companies can voluntarily undertake comprehensive 
diversity initiatives with greater certainty that their self-
analysis will be entitled to at least a qualified protection by the 
privilege. More fundamentally, by applying the Wigmore 
criteria with a mindful eye toward the Supreme Court’s 
guidance in Faragher, Ellerth and Kolstad that preventative 
measures are to be given primacy over litigious ones as a 
means of furthering diversity and equal employment and 
eliminating discrimination, courts will undoubtedly conclude, 
absent a showing of an unusual and compelling need by a 
plaintiff, that the self-critical analysis privilege should apply to 
the majority of diversity initiatives. This conclusion will result 
in greater protection and certainty. 
The proposed balancing analysis is a strong middle 
ground. It allows corporations to engage, with reasonable 
certainty, in self-examination such as diversity studies with 
the expectation that they will generally not be discoverable, 
while still providing a plaintiff with the ability to obtain 
information if he or she can show a direct need for it based on 
the claims and circumstances of the case.  
CONCLUSION 
There is undisputed benefit in diversity initiatives and 
discussions undertaken by employers. However, such steps 
cannot be freely taken while the threat of disclosure in 
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litigation looms. The most effective way to encourage such 
measures is to provide self-examination documents and 
information with a qualified self-critical analysis privilege. 
While courts have been reluctant to recognize the privilege, 
this situation may be remedied by revisiting the more recent 
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Careful examination of the cases 
reveals that the courts’ emphasis is misplaced and should focus 
on the changing nature of employment law and the primacy of 
preventative measures, as embodied in the trilogy of Faragher, 
Ellerth, and Kolstad. Armed with these decisions, courts can 
recognize and apply a carefully tailored privilege that balances 
the harms of disclosure against the benefits, thereby protecting 
the right of plaintiffs to pursue their claims, but also allowing 
rigorous candid self-analysis and dialogue to the benefit of the 
larger workforce. 
The Beer Summit exemplified the benefits of open 
communication in the resolution of diversity-related conflicts 
and the ways in which such open discourse can be used to 
improve diversity and relationships going forward. However, 
unlike the events in Cambridge that culminated in the Beer 
Summit, most conflicts do not enjoy the benefit of presidential 
mediation to facilitate resolution. Absent such divine 
intervention, a qualified self-critical analysis privilege for 
employment documents, such as the one proposed herein, 
would serve as an effective means of encouraging companies to 
review their actions, foster dialogue, and take proactive steps 
toward improving diversity. 
